The Tale of Two Genocides:
The Failed US Response to Rwanda and Darfur
By Africa Action
The Black Commentator

Wednesday 11 August 2006

Africa Action is the oldest Africa advocacy
organization in the U.S. Its mission is to change U.S.
Africa relations to promote political, economic and
social justice in Africa. Africa Action provides
accessible information and analysis, and mobilizes
popular support for campaigns to achieve this mission.

On September 9, the two-year anniversary of the
Bush Administration' s recognition that genocide is
occurring in Darfur, Africa Action joined with
hundreds of activists for a rally and act of civil
disobedience in front of the White House. During the
rally, participants made their mark of witness with
red handprints to represent the victims of the
genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. This gathering
emphasized the urgent need for concerted efforts by
the U.S. to remove the obstacles to the deployment of
a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force to protect
the people of Darfur.

Introduction

In 1994, an estimated 800,000 people died in
Rwanda, as the U.S. and the international community
failed to mount an intervention to stop genocide.
Senior U.S. officials later expressed regret, and
acknowledged that this crime against humanity should
have invoked a more urgent and active response. It is
reported that President Bush reviewed a memo on the
Rwandan genocide early in his presidency and wrote
"Not on my Watch" in the margin of that document.[1]

Less than a decade after the Rwandan genocide, the
U.S. was faced with another unfolding genocide in
Africa, this time in Darfur, western Sudan. In early
2003, the government of Sudan and its proxy militias
unleashed a scorched earth campaign, targeting
civilians from three African communities in Darfur and
causing untold death and destruction.

More than three years later, the Darfur genocide
is continuing on the Bush Administration' s watch. The
U.S. has again failed to take the action necessary to
stop the violence and protect civilians from genocide.
The dynamics are different on the ground and
internationally, and the level of engagement among
policymakers and the public is different in this case,
too. But the failure to stop genocide once again is
clear, and the outcome remains the same - the loss of
hundreds of thousands of African lives as the world
looks on.

This report by Africa Action identifies patterns
in the U.S. response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994
and to the current genocide in Darfur, Sudan. It
explores the similarities and differences in the
reaction of U.S. policymakers and the American public,
and it examines the important lessons the U.S. has yet
to learn. Finally, Africa Action lays out in this
report the actions needed now from the U.S. to stop
the genocide in Darfur. It underscores the possibility
and necessity of a more urgent and effective U.S.
response to this genocide, and the obligation of the
entire international community to assert its
responsibility to protect the people of Darfur.

This Africa Action report is released on September
9, 2006 to mark the two-year anniversary of the Bush
Administration' s acknowledgement that what is
happening in Darfur constitutes genocide. The passage
of this anniversary and the continuation of the
genocide in Darfur indicate the inadequacy of U.S.
policies in response to this crisis.

The United States and Genocide in Rwanda

In one hundred days of genocide, beginning in
April 1994, Rwanda experienced a death toll with a
speed and magnitude unparalleled in modern history. In
a carefully planned and nearly successful attempt to
eliminate the Tutsi minority, the Hutu-controlled
government incited masses of the Hutu population to
take up arms against those deemed enemies of the
state. As a result, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and
moderate Hutu were killed.[2]

Today, the world recognizes the shamefully
inadequate international response to the genocide in
Rwanda. The United Nations (UN) observes a Day of
Remembrance for this genocide's victims, and numerous
world leaders have repeated the mantra of "never
again." However, as the violence unfolded on the
ground twelve years ago, the international community
stood silently by, and key leaders such as the United
States maneuvered to avoid direct engagement and to
limit any robust response to stop the killing.

What the US Knew

During President Bill Clinton's trip to Africa in
1998, he stopped in Kigali, Rwanda, to deliver an
apology for not having done "as much as we could" to
stop the genocide in 1994. He announced to an audience
at the Kigali airport, "[A]ll over the world there
were people like me sitting in offices, day after day
after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and
the speed with which you were being engulfed by this
unimaginable terror."[3]

In fact, there exists a great deal of evidence to
suggest that detailed information on the scope of the
genocide was indeed available to the U.S. - both
before and during the massacres in Rwanda. Reports
suggesting a high likelihood of massive ethnic
violence had been available even during the early
1990s. In January 1994, U.S. intelligence analysts had
predicted that in case of renewed conflict in Rwanda,
"the worst-case scenario would involve one half
million people dying."[4] In the final analysis, even
these dire forecasts proved to be conservative.

On April 6, 1994, the same day that Rwandan
President Habyarimana' s plane was shot down and the
crisis began to unfold, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs Prudence Bushnell drafted an urgent
memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. In it,
she warned that the assassination could prompt an
outbreak of killings, and she urged the U.S. to appeal
for calm.[5]

Within days, Joyce Leader, Deputy Chief of Mission
stationed in Rwanda, realized that a pattern of clear
and systematic killing of Tutsi had emerged.[6] Lists
of the names of Tutsi and some Hutu targets had been
compiled and distributed, and blocks were being set up
along the roads to check people's identification
papers and separate those who would be eliminated.

Recognizing the extreme danger on the ground, the
U.S. made the decision to evacuate all American
citizens from Rwanda. By April 10, 1994, the U.S
Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson and 250 American
citizens had been evacuated from the country.[7] Memos
prepared for U.S. officials in subsequent days warned
of a massive and impending "bloodbath". [8] Though
fully briefed on the unfolding crisis, the Clinton
Administration took no action to halt the growing
violence, and instead began to lobby for the
withdrawal of the UN force in Rwanda.[9]

As it continued to monitor the situation, the
State Department convened daily interagency meetings,
also featuring representatives from the Pentagon, the
National Security Council, and the wider intelligence
community.[10] In the following weeks, U.S.
intelligence and defense reports repeated similar
messages, warning of a worsening crisis and growing
death toll in Rwanda. On April 26, 1994, an
intelligence memo named individuals responsible for
organizing the violence and warned of their intent to
exterminate the Tutsi population. On May 9, 1994, a
Defense Intelligence Agency report discounted the
notion that these massacres were spontaneous and
instead pointed the finger at the Rwandan government,
which was clearly targeting lists of people for
destruction. [11]

During the weeks in which the genocide unfolded,
staff within the administration and in the
intelligence community were steadily confronted with
irrefutable evidence. The U.S. made an informed
decision in choosing not to act to stop the genocide
in Rwanda.

What the US Did

In a February 2004 interview, Madeleine Albright
commented on her role at the time as the U.S.
ambassador to the UN. She stated, "I have reviewed the
record a lot, and I don't think actually that we could
have done more. I just wish that it had not been
something that the international community was not
capable of dealing with. So it's a huge regret."[12]

It is clear, however, that the U.S. could indeed
have done more. In the face of U.S. intelligence
clearly demonstrating the rapidly escalating violence,
the question was not one of U.S. inability to respond,
but one of a lack of political will. A great effort
was made to ensure that the U.S. would avoid any
direct involvement, and particularly any military
commitment, in Rwanda. This priority not only led to
deliberate inaction on the part of the Clinton
Administration, but also to proactive blocking of
international efforts to save lives.

Under the pretext that the reputation of
peacekeeping was suffering due to recent public
failures, the U.S. lobbied to have the UN force in
Rwanda, UNAMIR, either removed or drastically reduced.
Administration officials apparently feared that
increased UN peacekeeping would eventually require
some U.S. troop commitment. They actively supported a
UN withdrawal from Rwanda even as the genocide was
underway.[13] As a result of U.S. lobbying at the UN
Security Council, the decision was made to slash the
force size in Rwanda and leave only 270 peacekeepers
behind.[14] This action left the people of Rwanda
without any international protection from the
genocide.

The Clinton Administration promised to support an
arms embargo, and to work towards the renewal of the
peace process, but this rhetoric produced no change on
the ground. U.S. officials acknowledged that an arms
embargo would essentially be useless in the face of a
genocide carried out mainly with machetes and other
farm implements.[ 15] There also seemed little chance
of a return to the negotiating table in the midst of
such bloodshed in Rwanda.

The lack of real U.S. engagement on Rwanda was
clear. Demonstrating the dearth of high-level
attention, President Clinton did not devote a single
meeting of his senior foreign policy advisors to
devising U.S. options for action on the crisis.[16]
Some low- and mid-level officials, recognizing the
lack of top-level support for larger engagement,
sought more moderate tactics to lessen the death toll.
One suggestion was to jam the hateful radio
transmissions, which were inciting the general
population to take up arms. This proposal was rejected
as a costly endeavor that would have too little
effect.[17]

As the weeks of violence dragged on, U.S.
officials consciously and consistently evaded the use
of the term "genocide," for fear of invoking a
responsibility to act.[18] Spokespeople for the
administration were challenged repeatedly on this
question. They were, in fact, instructed as to the
precise language approved for use by the U.S. State
Department. At the same time, a message from a U.S.
political advisor to the State Department in late
April stated that the events in Rwanda clearly met the
definition of genocide laid out in the 1948 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. This message warned that acknowledging this
publicly might force the UN Security Council to act.
U.S. decisions and statements were carefully
orchestrated to evade any such responsibility to act,
even as many U.S. officials privately recognized the
extent of the crisis and the need for international
action in response.

On June 7, 1994, President Clinton stated that
humanitarian aid was all that the U.S. could provide
to Rwanda, in light of other American military
commitments in Europe and Asia. Later that month, the
President defended the U.S. response on Rwanda to
Members of Congress who requested troop deployment.
The President cited U.S. payment for medical supplies
and its pressure for a cease-fire as evidence of a
strong U.S. response to the crisis.[19]

In July 1994, President Clinton finally announced
the provision of humanitarian relief for Rwanda, and
requested emergency funding from Congress for this
effort.[20] By this time, the genocide had essentially
been completed, and some 800,000 Rwandan lives had
been lost.What Influenced the U.S. Response

When the genocide occurred in Rwanda in 1994, the
U.S. administration was still recovering from the
incident the previous year in Somalia, when eighteen
American soldiers had been killed during a
U.S.-sponsored humanitarian intervention. Many
officials believed that the American population was
unwilling to stomach any more U.S. casualties abroad,
and that there were insufficient U.S. interests in
Rwanda to warrant another military commitment in
Africa.

Meanwhile, there seemed to be no domestic movement
invested in this issue and pressuring the U.S.
leadership to stop the genocide in Rwanda.
Representatives of a leading human rights organization
lobbying for greater U.S. commitment on the crisis
were told by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake:
"If you want to make this move, you will have to
change public opinion. You must make more noise."[21]
There seemed to be no concerted "noise" forthcoming.

After the genocide was over, Senator Paul Simon
famously said, "If every member of the House and
Senate had received 100 letters from people back home
saying we have to do something about Rwanda, when the
crisis was first developing, then I think the response
would have been different."[ 22] In the absence of such
public activism, the U.S. did not feel compelled to
act.

As far as U.S. officials in the Clinton
Administration were concerned, there was no political
cost to inaction against the Rwandan genocide, as
opposed to a potentially steep political cost to U.S.
embroilment in yet another violent African quagmire.
This appears to have been the final determination of
U.S. policy toward Rwanda, even as the human cost of
inaction became devastatingly clear.

The United States and Genocide in Darfur

The ongoing genocide in Darfur marks the first
genocide of the 21st century, and the first the world
has faced in Africa since Rwanda in 1994. It began in
early 2003, when the government of Sudan and its proxy
militias (known as the Janjaweed) launched a campaign
of genocide against three African communities - the
Fur, the Zaghawa and the Massaleit - in Darfur,
because rebel groups from that region had risen up to
challenge Khartoum's authoritarian rule and their own
marginalization.

Three and a half years later, the genocide in
Darfur continues today. Some 500,000 lives have been
lost,[23] with millions more Darfuris left homeless
and facing a growing man-made humanitarian crisis,
which forms part of this genocide. Although there has
been some U.S. engagement on this crisis, largely
prompted by a groundswell of activism nationwide, the
Bush Administration has failed to take the action
necessary to stop the violence and protect the people
of Darfur.

What the US Said

Two years ago today (September 9, 2004), the Bush
Administration acknowledged that what is happening in
Darfur constitutes genocide. This announcement was the
result of political pressure from Congress and citizen
pressure from across the U.S. The legal finding was
itself based on overwhelming evidence from a study of
the region completed by the State Department the
previous month.[24]

In his testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on September 9, 2004
then-Secretary of State Colin Powell first used the
word "genocide" to describe the crisis in Darfur, and
he identified the government of Sudan and the
Janjaweed as the perpetrators. A White House statement
later that day confirmed this determination. [25]

Despite this acknowledgment of genocide, however,
the administration immediately ruled out any urgent
response to what was happening in Darfur. In his same
testimony on September 9, Secretary Powell declared,
"no new action is dictated by this determination. "[26]

Two weeks later, President Bush addressed the UN
General Assembly, reiterating the U.S. position that
genocide was occurring in Darfur, but urging no new
international action to address it.[27] Though
President Bush claimed to be "appalled by the
violence" in Darfur, and though he asserted that only
outside action could stop the violence,[28] no such
action was initiated by the U.S. in response to the
genocide. Other than a brief response to a question on
Darfur posed to the President during the election
debates in October,[29] the White House would remain
silent on the crisis for months thereafter.

In early 2005, as the crisis in Darfur deepened,
senior officials at the State Department, including
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, began to
evade media questions on Darfur and backed away from
using the term "genocide." A spokesperson at the White
House defended the apparent lack of engagement by the
U.S. on Darfur, stating that the President had "more
pressing priorities" than this crime against
humanity.[30]

In June 2005, President Bush responded to growing
pressure from advocates and from the media by breaking
his months-long silence on Darfur. He reiterated the
U.S. position that genocide was occurring but
suggested no new plan to stop the violence.[31]

As the situation on the ground continued to
deteriorate in late 2005 and into 2006, the President
and senior administration officials spoke out more
frequently on Darfur, seeking to ward off criticism
and respond to growing activism on this crisis. But
their words were not matched with action.

The death toll in Darfur continued to mount, even
as top-level officials repeatedly claimed that the
U.S. was doing everything possible to stop the
genocide. In a television interview in February 2006,
Vice President Dick Cheney said on Darfur: "I am
satisfied we are doing everything we can do."[32] In
May 2006, in testimony before the House International
Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, declared Darfur to be
"a top priority for...elected officials", and
emphasized "the Administration is working diligently
toward a resolution." [33] But these statements rang
hollow in the absence of U.S. action to stop the
violence.

A White House fact sheet on Darfur in May 2006
said that the President maintained that what was
happening in Darfur genocide because "no other word
captures the extent of this tragedy."[34] But this
fact sheet was created twenty months after the U.S.'
recognition of genocide in Darfur, and the violence
was worsening without action to stop it.

What the US Did

The U.S. response to the genocide in Darfur has
involved engagement in some aspects of the crisis, in
an attempt to mitigate the humanitarian crisis and
promote a long-term solution. But on the most
immediate priority of stopping the violence and
providing protection to the people of Darfur, the U.S.
has failed to articulate or pursue a successful plan
of action.

The U.S. has provided significant financial
support for humanitarian efforts in Darfur, where the
largest humanitarian operation in the world struggles
to cope with growing numbers of people in need. As aid
agencies have increasingly voiced concerns about the
dangerous conditions on the ground, and have been
forced to take measures to curtail their operations at
certain moments, the U.S. has helped to fund their
operations but has failed to tackle the growing
violence and insecurity they face. In the first three
years of the genocide, the U.S. provided $1 billion in
humanitarian aid for Darfur, helping to sustain
millions of people left dependent on international
assistance.[ 35] The U.S. did not, however, take steps
to directly address the worsening security situation
or to protect civilians and humanitarian operations on
the ground.

The U.S. also made a diplomatic investment in the
Abuja peace talks, sponsored by the African Union
(AU). The administration repeatedly expressed its
commitment to a "political solution" to the ongoing
crisis in Darfur. Senior U.S. officials, particularly
Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick, traveled a number
of times to Khartoum and to Abuja, Nigeria. However,
occasional trips and periodic remarks about U.S.
engagement failed to substitute for assertive
international leadership to stop the genocide. In
fact, the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May
2006, which was heavily promoted by the U.S., actually
led to a spike in violence in subsequent months. As AU
officials condemned the striking increase in violence
and civilian casualties in the summer of 2006,[36] the
U.S. and international response failed to address the
deteriorating situation on the ground.

The "hands off" U.S. strategy on Darfur was
initially framed by the administration as deference to
the African Union, which had shown some leadership on
the crisis and had deployed a small mission to the
region. In fact, the AU was essentially abandoned by
the international community to deal with the growing
crisis. While it was clear that the African Union's
mission in Darfur lacked the troop size, the mandate
and the logistical capacity to stop the genocide and
protect the people, the U.S.' limited financial and
logistical support for the AU was described by the
Bush Administration as a central element of its
response to the crisis. The U.S. offered transport
planes to bring AU troops to Darfur, it worked with
NATO members to provide planning and logistical
assistance and intelligence support to the AU, and it
committed some funding to extend the life of the AU
operation. But it was already abundantly clear that a
larger international intervention was required, if
this genocide was to be stopped.

At the international level, the U.S. introduced or
supported numerous UN Security Council resolutions on
Darfur, condemning the violence, urging an end to
atrocities, and even imposing some limited sanctions
on those perpetrating war crimes and crimes against
humanity. But the U.S. did not begin to push for a
large and robust international peacekeeping force
until 2006, and even then, it did not invest
sufficiently in galvanizing international support
around this goal. Although the Bush Administration
described itself as a leader on Darfur, and although
it had affirmed the September 2005 UN commitment of a
"Responsibility to Protect" civilians against crimes
against humanity such as genocide,[37] the U.S. failed
to take the necessary action to stem the bloodshed in
Darfur.

Within the UN, U.S. Ambassador John Bolton claimed
in 2006 to have built up a strong track record on the
crisis in Darfur,[38] though his actions revealed
otherwise. In October 2005, Bolton joined with
representatives from China, Russia and Algeria in
blocking the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide, Juan Mendez, from briefing the Security
Council on human rights violations in Darfur. In
February 2006, when the U.S. held the rotating
presidency of the Security Council, Bolton issued a
rhetorical "Presidential Statement" rather than
seeking to galvanize Security Council support for
action in the form of a resolution authorizing a
peacekeeping mission for Darfur. In June 2006, when a
Security Council delegation traveled to Sudan to
highlight their concern about the crisis and their
commitment to achieving agreement on a UN peacekeeping
force, Bolton did not participate and instead sent the
lowest-level representative of any of the 15-member
Security Council delegation.[ 39]

In the summer of 2006, as the situation in Darfur
deteriorated still further, there finally emerged an
international consensus around the need for a UN
peacekeeping force to stop the violence and restore
security. This notion received public support from the
U.S., the UN Secretary-General, most members of the UN
Security Council, the AU, the leadership of the Arab
League, and dozens of organizations and millions of
public citizens. The UN Secretary-General presented
recommendations to the Security Council on the
necessary size, mandate, scope and logistical capacity
of a future UN peacekeeping mission for Darfur, with
the remaining obstacle being Khartoum's opposition to
such a mission.[40]

At the writing of this report, a new resolution
passed at the Security Council promised new momentum
on Darfur, but as yet the deployment of a UN force
remains stalled. As the government of Sudan continues
to reject the prospect of a UN peacekeeping mission,
the need for U.S. leadership and action is paramount.
The ongoing failure of the U.S. to take effective
steps to break the international deadlock, overcome
Khartoum's opposition, and achieve a UN peacekeeping
mission for Darfur continues to reveal a lack of
serious engagement in resolving this crisis.

What Influenced the US Response

The crisis in Darfur has generated unprecedented
citizen activism across the U.S. A diversity of groups
and people of conscience from all faiths and
backgrounds have become engaged in advocacy and
activism on Darfur, raising awareness of the genocide
and promoting a more urgent U.S. response. These
citizen voices, and the media attention which they
have commanded, have influenced the administration' s
response, evoking pledges of commitment and some new
engagement. Numerous rallies and events held around
the country, and millions of communications sent to
policymakers by constituents, have raised the profile
of this issue and demanded U.S. action. This activism
was part of what led the White House to call this
"genocide" in 2004, and it has continued to drive the
U.S. engagement on this issue.

Other factors also seemed to argue for greater
U.S. action on Darfur. Comments made by the President
and other senior officials indicated a rhetorical
commitment to avoiding the mistakes made during the
Rwandan genocide, and asserted the "Responsibility to
Protect" civilians. In addition, the UN Security
Council proved to be amenable to passing numerous
resolutions on Darfur, and the long timeline of this
crisis allowed ample opportunities to overcome
obstacles and promote new action.

But other, more powerful factors and competing
priorities apparently negated these potential
motivators for U.S. action.

At the time when the Darfur genocide began, the
U.S. was involved in promoting a peace settlement in
Sudan in the long-running civil war between the
government in the North and the people of the South.
The official relationship between the U.S. and Sudan
appeared to be on the path towards a thaw, after an
isolationist approach to Khartoum by Washington in the
1990s as a result of Sudan's hosting of Al Qaeda.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
Khartoum invited an intelligence- sharing relationship
with the U.S. in the context of the so-called "War on
Terrorism."[ 41]

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) between North and South in Sudan was
considered a diplomatic victory for the U.S., but also
coincided with the beginning of the
government-sponsore d genocide in Darfur. The U.S.
support for the CPA, its intelligence- sharing
relationship with Khartoum, and the mutual desire to
move towards the normalization of economic and
political relations between the countries were policy
priorities that were considered to have undermined a
more robust U.S. response on Darfur.

Ironically, at the same time, these interests and
ties between Washington and Khartoum provided the Bush
Administration with clear leverage and opportunities
to push Sudan to stop the genocide and allow UN
peacekeepers into Darfur. As the international
community stalled in overcoming Khartoum's objections
to a UN force, the U.S. could have done much more to
challenge the Sudanese government and find a way
forward on Darfur.

It is also clear that the U.S. could have invested
sooner and more deeply in international diplomacy on
Darfur, to help mobilize new action on this crisis.
But the Bush Administration wished to retain its
international leverage and its political capital for
other concerns, in the Middle East and in the larger
so-called "War on Terrorism." In the White House's
consideration of geo-strategic calculations and
foreign policy priorities, the people of Darfur lost
out and they have paid the ultimate price.

Lessons Yet to Learn

In Rwanda in 1994, the Clinton Administration
refused to name the unfolding genocide. The U.S. also
failed to act to stop it. It blocked international
intervention in Rwanda, claiming that there was no
domestic constituency nor compelling foreign policy
interest to support U.S. action on this crisis. The
U.S. failures on Rwanda, summarized in this report,
have been well documented elsewhere.

In Darfur, the Bush Administration remains the
only government to have publicly acknowledged that
what is happening constitutes genocide. But this
declaration has not galvanized official U.S. action
sufficient to stop the violence on the ground. The
U.S. has made some diplomatic investment in the peace
process in Darfur, and some financial investment in
humanitarian efforts, but it has failed to implement a
successful strategy to protect the people of Darfur
from the ongoing genocide. The unprecedented activism
across the country has forced rhetorical commitments
from the administration, but these have not been
followed by concrete actions to improve the security
situation in western Sudan.

Despite some key differences in the domestic and
international dynamics today, compared to twelve years
ago during the Rwandan genocide, the U.S. response on
Darfur reveals that important lessons remain
unlearned.

As successive U.S. administrations have been faced
with genocide in Africa, each has claimed to be doing
everything possible in response. This has been untrue
and this assertion is, therefore, disingenuous. The
U.S. is the most powerful country in the world, with
an unmatched capacity to respond to crises and to
mobilize the broader international community's
response. If the U.S. were to do everything it could
to stop genocide, it is certain that it would succeed
in doing so. Instead, in Rwanda and now in Darfur, the
U.S. claims it is fully invested in addressing this
crisis, but it is not expending the necessary
diplomatic or political resources to achieve an
international peacekeeping force, which is the most
immediate priority.

In Rwanda, the Clinton Administration offered
humanitarian assistance but refused to support the
necessary intervention in the form of an international
peacekeeping force. In Darfur, once again, the Bush
Administration has been quite generous in the
provision of support to the humanitarian effort, and
it has also afforded logistical support to the African
Union. But the U.S. has not invested sufficiently in
achieving the deployment of the necessary peacekeeping
force, to respond to the most urgent priority of
protecting the people of Darfur. The crime of
genocide, which seeks to destroy a group of people in
whole or in part, demands more than a humanitarian
response. The international community must be prepared
to deploy a peacekeeping force to stop the violence,
and must quickly do so in response to such a crisis.
This was not a U.S. priority in Rwanda in 1994, and it
is clearly not a U.S. priority in Darfur today.

In a broader sense, the failed response to Rwanda
and now to Darfur indicates a shameful negligence on
the part of the U.S. when it comes to saving African
lives. In the realm of U.S. foreign policy priorities,
Africa is most often absent or marginalized, and the
human cost of this myopia is most clear in the death
toll of these two genocides. In Rwanda in 1994, the
Clinton Administration was more focused on the crisis
in the former Yugoslavia, and was still reeling from
the disastrous U.S. intervention in Somalia the
previous year. In Darfur at present, the U.S. is
focused more urgently on the crisis in the Middle
East, on the war in Iraq and on the so-called "War on
Terrorism", which are estimated to be more pressing
policy priorities than genocide in Africa.

There is a clear pattern of a lack of political
will on the part of U.S. officials to take action to
save African lives. It is hard to imagine another part
of the world where genocide would be left to continue,
and where the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives
would be tolerated. The persistent racism in U.S.
foreign policy is clear from the lack of urgency with
which the U.S. responds to genocide on the African
continent.

While in Rwanda, Clinton Administration officials
claimed that the genocide happened quickly, that they
were ill informed, and that there was insufficient
public activism, these excuses cannot be used to
explain the U.S. failure to stop the genocide in
Darfur. But there is the same lack of political will
in both instances. The rhetoric and the profile of the
Darfur crisis do not mask the underlying U.S. failure,
once again, to save the lives of countless innocent
civilians.

Recommendations

Unlike during the Rwandan genocide, which took
place in only three months, the U.S. and the
international community have now watched the Darfur
genocide play out over several years, with ample time
to absorb what was happening, and to identify the
possibilities and priorities for action.

Although, at the writing of this report, estimates
indicate that some 500,000 lives have already been
lost in Darfur, Africa Action asserts opportunities
and obligations for new action that can still save
countless lives.

With protection being the clear and immediate
priority, the first step must be the deployment of a
UN peacekeeping mission to the region. The African
Union's leadership on Darfur has been important, but
there exists a larger international responsibility to
act in support of the AU to stop the genocide and
protect civilians in western Sudan. The AU cannot do
this alone, nor should it have to. An international
peacekeeping force must be deployed that is adequate
in size and mandate to stop the violence in Darfur and
provide security to civilians and humanitarian
operations in the immediate term, and that can pave
the way for a true peace process and ultimately
facilitate the return of millions of displaced people
to their lands.

The establishment of such a peacekeeping mission
is entirely consistent with the "Responsibility to
Protect" principle, according to which all UN member
states agreed in September 2005 that there is an
international obligation to protect populations
against genocide and other crimes against humanity.
The agreement of UN member states that they "are
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and
decisive manner" to help protect populations from
genocide and other such crimes against humanity must
now drive their response to the crisis in Darfur.[42]

Achieving the deployment of the required UN
peacekeeping operation for Darfur, with the necessary
size, scope and mandate, involves a special role for
the U.S. At the international level, it requires new
and urgent action from the U.S. to overcome all
remaining obstacles to such a force, and to secure all
necessary support from the members of the UN Security
Council to move this forward quickly. The U.S. must
use its leverage with all stakeholders, including the
Sudanese government, to pave the way for the rapid
deployment of the requisite UN force. The U.S. must
itself be prepared to commit substantial new resources
and logistical assistance to the future UN
peacekeeping operation in Darfur. The U.S. must also
continue to provide generous support to humanitarian
assistance programs in Darfur and throughout the
region to meet the urgent needs of the people on the
ground.

While a UN peacekeeping force is not the final
answer for Darfur, it is essential to stabilize the
situation and protect the vulnerable in the immediate
term, and it represents a first step on the path to
peace. In responding to genocide, civilian protection
is both a priority and an obligation, and this should
always trigger urgent international action.

Conclusion

A decade after failing to stop genocide in Rwanda,
and two years ago today, the Bush Administration
publicly recognized that genocide was taking place in
Darfur, Sudan. This declaration suggested a different
and more engaged response than what had been seen in
Rwanda. Yet this has not been borne out. The genocide
continues in Darfur, and the U.S. has failed to stop
the violence or protect civilians on the ground.

The achievement of a large and robust
international peacekeeping force for Darfur remains
elusive without strong leadership and new action. The
U.S. claims to be doing all it can on this crisis, but
the death toll is mounting and it is clear that much
more can and must be done. The most important
immediate priority is providing protection to the
people of Darfur, and an international peacekeeping
force can achieve this. What is missing is the
political will on the part of the Bush Administration
to overcome remaining obstacles and make this a
reality.

The U.S. and the international community have been
judged harshly for their failures on Rwanda, and world
leaders have apologized for their inaction on that
genocide twelve years ago. But history will judge
current policies on Darfur just as severely. The
failure of the Bush Administration to take the
necessary steps to stop genocide in Darfur, and the
subsequent cost in human lives, belies U.S. claims
that it is mounting a committed response to this
crisis and denies the reality that much more could and
should have been done before now.

As the genocide continues in Darfur, it becomes an
increasing political liability for the Bush
Administration. It is an indictment of the current
White House, but it is also a comment on Africa's
place in U.S. foreign policy.

Unless we learn the lessons of Rwanda and apply
them now in Darfur, we confirm a pattern of negligence
that destines the U.S. to repeat these horrific
failures in the future.

Endnotes

[1] Philip Gourevitch, "Just Watching," The New
Yorker, 5 June 2006

[2] PBS, Frontline, "The Triumph of Evil: 100 Days
of Slaughter"

[3] Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," The
Atlantic Monthly, September 2001

[4] Organization of African Unity, "Rwanda: The
Preventable Genocide," OAU report by International
Panel of Eminent Personalities, July 2000

[5] William Ferroggiaro, ed. "The US and the
Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction," The
National Security Archive at the George Washington
University, 20 August 2001. Document #2: "Memorandum
from Prudence Bushnell, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, through Peter
Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 'Death of
Rwandan and Burundian Presidents in Plane Crash
Outside Kigali', April 6, 1994. Limited Official Use."

[6] PBS, Frontline, "Ghosts of Rwanda: Interviews:
Joyce Leader"

[7] Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

[8] Ferroggiaro, ed. "The US and the Genocide in
Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction," Document #3:
"Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Middle East/Africa, through Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs, to Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Talking Points On
Rwanda/Burundi" , April 11, 1994. Confidential. "

[9] Ferroggiaro, ed. "The U.S. and the Genocide in
Rwanda 1994: Information, Intelligence and the U.S.
Response," The National Security Archive at the George
Washington University, 24 March 2004. Footnote #11:
"US Department of State, cable number 94 State 099440,
to US Mission to the United Nations, New York,
"Talking Points for UNAMIR Withdrawal", April 15,
1994."

[10] Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

[11] Samantha Power, "A Problem from Hell":
America and the Age of Genocide (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2002) 355.

[12] PBS, Frontline, "Ghosts of Rwanda:
Interviews: Madeleine Albright"

[13] Ferroggiaro, ed. "The U.S. and the Genocide
in Rwanda 1994: Information, Intelligence and the U.S.
Response," Footnote #11: "US Department of State,
cable number 94 State 099440, to US Mission to the
United Nations, New York, "Talking Points for UNAMIR
Withdrawal", April 15, 1994."

[14] Gerald Caplan, "Why we must never forget the
Rwandan Genocide," Pambazuka News: Weekly Forum for
Social Justice in Africa, 1 April 2004

[15] Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the
Age of Genocide, 371.

[16] Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."

[17] PBS, Frontline, "Ghosts of Rwanda: Timeline"

[18] Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the
Age of Genocide, 361.

[19] Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the
Age of Genocide, 377.

[20] Chris McGreal, Ian Katz, and Ian Black,
"Rwandan Apocalypse," The Guardian, 23 July 1994.

[21] Human Rights Watch, "Remembering Rwanda:
Africa in Conflict, Yesterday and Today" (Campaign)

[22] Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Secret Genocide
Archive," The New York Times, 23 February 2005

[23] Eric Reeves, "Quantifying Genocide in Darfur
(Part 1)," SudanReeves. org, 28 April 2006.

[24] "Documenting Atrocities in Darfur," (State
Publication 11182, Released by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research) September 2004

[25] "President's Statement on Violence in Darfur,
Sudan," (Statement by the President, Office of the
Press Secretary), 9 September 2004

[26] Colin Powell, "The Crisis in Darfur,
Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee," 9 September 2004

[27] "Remarks by the President in Address to the
United Nations General Assembly," 21 September 2004

[28] "President's Statement on Violence in Darfur,
Sudan," 9 September 2004.

[29] Commission on Presidential Debates, "2004
Debate Transcript, The First Bush-Kerry Presidential
Debate," 30 September 2004

[30] Guy Dinmore, "White House is quiet as Darfur
killings continue," Financial Times, 14 March 2005.

[31] "President and South African President Mbeki
Discuss Bilateral Relations" (Oval Office, Office of
the Press Secretary), 1 June 2005

[32] PBS, The Newshour with Jim Lehrer,
"Newsmaker: Vice President Dick Cheney," 7 February
2006

[33] Jendayi Frazer, "Prospects for Peace in
Darfur, Testimony Before the House International
Relations Committee," 18 May 2006

[34] "Fact Sheet: Darfur Agreement: A Step toward
Peace" (Office of the Press Secretary), 8 May 2006

[35] Charles W. Corey, "United States Has Spent $1
Billion Feeding the Hungry in Darfur," USINFO, 12 May
2006

[36] African Union, "Press Statement on the
Escalation of Violence in Darfur," 11 July 2006

[37] "The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty"

[38] "John Bolton's Work at the UN: The Situation
in Sudan," Office of the Public Liaison, Fact-sheet
forwarded by the White House.

[39] StopBolton.org, "Three Strikes, You're Out:
Bolton Fails Darfur; Take Action Now to Oust Bolton"
(Action Alert), August 2006

[40] "Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur"
(S/2006/591) , United Nations Security Council, 28 July
2006

[41] Ken Silverstein, "Official Pariah Sudan
Valuable to America's War on Terrorism," The Los
Angeles Times, 29 April, 2005.

[42] "The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty. "

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This report was written by Ann-Louise Colgan, with
valuable contributions from Diana Duarte. Additional
research support was provided by Petra Stankard and
was produced by Africa Action, with partial support
from American Jewish World Service (AJWS). The views
and conclusions expressed in this report reflect those
of Africa Action, and not necessarily those of AJWS.

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